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State corporate statutes at the end of the twentieth century
face three related challenges. The principal challenge stems from
the increasing popularity of the philosophy that state corporate
codes should be more "enabling" and contain fewer "mandatory"
provisions.' That is, the state should permit the organizers of
corporations and their investors the maximum freedom to shape
the terms of the corporation's governance. Those parties, some
argue, are better situated than the state to choose a scheme of
corporate governance that will allow the firm to maximize the
individual wealth of the participants.2 Implicit in this argument
is the premise that wealth maximization is preferable to any
other goal of private law.3 As this philosophy, sometimes
* Professor of Law, University of Colorado School of Law. A.B., 1969, J.D.,
1974, University of Illinois. The author wishes to thank his colleagues J. Dennis
Hynes and Clifford J. Calhoun for their helpful comments on an earlier draft.
1. See Douglas M. Branson, The Death of Contractarianism and the Vindication
of Structure and Authority in Corporate Governance and Corporate Law, in
PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW 95 (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995) ("[TIhe mandatory
content of corporate law is minimalist when compared to the near sumptuary laws
that some corporate statutes in the past contained.").
2. See infra notes 29-30 and accompanying text. This argument is developed
at length in FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 1-39 (1991), and it is also the basis for a rich
literature in the law reviews. See, e.g., William W. Bratton, Jr., The 'Nexus of
Contracts' Corporation: A Critical Appraisal, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 407 (1989); Henry
N. Butler, The Contractual Theory of the Corporation, 11 GEO. MASON L. REV. 99
(1989); see also Symposium, Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L.
REV. 1395 (1989).
3. The goal of wealth maximization is not unchallenged. See David Millon,
Communitarianism in Corporate Law: Foundations and Law Reform Strategies, in
PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW 1 (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995) (discussing the
communitarian view, which "focuses on the sociological and moral phenomenon of
the corporation as community, in contrast to the individualistic, self-reliant,
contractarian stance that dominates current academic discourse in corporate law").
This challenge to wealth maximization finds expression in "other constituency
statutes" that permit, or require, the directors to consider the impact of their
decisions on nonshareholders. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-313(e) (West
Supp. 1996) ("shall"); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-35-1(d) (Michie Supp. 1996) ("may"). See
generally Morey W. McDaniel, Stockholders and Stakeholders, 21 STETSON L. REV.
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characterized as a "contractarian" philosophy, gains dominance,
state legislators will be hard-pressed to justify existing or new
mandatory provisions in corporate codes.4 In fact, the most recent
draft of the Model Business Corporation Act reflects this trend
toward enabling acts and, while many mandatory provisions
remain,5 their future is in doubt.6
The second challenge facing state corporate law is the
increasing number of alternative forms of business organization
from which organizers of a business can choose.' In recent years,
states have adopted legislation authorizing the creation of a
number of new forms of business organization, such as limited
121 (1991); Steven M. H. Wallman, The Proper Interpretation of Corporate
Constituency Statutes and Formulation of Director Duties, 21 STETSON L. REV. 163
(1991).
4. Professor Branson has declared that the "contractarian movement peaked."
Branson, supra note 1, at 95. Professor Branson seems to dance on a grave not yet
dug. The ABA Revised Model Business Corporation Act, which in his view embodies
a strong enabling bias, continues to gain acceptance by state legislatures. And the
recent action by the Colorado legislature, which amended Colorado's version of the
Revised Model Business Corporation Act to remove two mandatory provisions,
demonstrates that at the grass-roots level contractarianism is very much alive. See
infra notes 56-66 and accompanying text.
5. See, e.g., REVISED MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.01 (requiring a corporation to
have a board of directors, unless there are 50 or fewer shareholders, in which case
the articles may specify an alternative mechanism for governance), §§ 8.05 and 8.06
(limiting the terms of directors to three years if the board is a staggered board and
to one year if not), §§ 7.01 and 8.03 (requiring a corporation to hold an annual
meeting for the election of directors), § 8.30 (listing the standards of conduct for
directors), § 8.42 (listing the standards of conduct for officers), § 16.02 (granting the
shareholder rights to inspect and copy certain corporate books and records), § 16.20
(requiring a corporation to furnish annual financial statement to shareholders), §
10.03 (amending articles only upon the consent of the holders of a majority of the
outstanding shares), § 14.02 (allowing dissolution of corporation voluntarily only
upon the consent of the holders of a majority of the outstanding shares), § 13.02
(giving shareholders the right to dissent and receive the fair value of their shares in
the event of certain mergers, share exchanges, sale of substantially all of the
corporate assets and amendments to the articles of incorporation), and § 10.20
(retaining the shareholders' right to amend the corporation's bylaws) (1984).
6. See Douglas M. Branson, Recent Changes to the Model Business Corporation
Act: Death Knells for Main Street Corporation Law, 72 NEB. L. REV. 258 (1993).
7. In 1995 the Colorado General Assembly added to the list of alternatives by
passing statutes permitting the creation of registered limited liability partnerships
and registered limited liability limited partnerships. See COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 7-60-
101 to -154 (1996). See generally Robert R. Keating et al., Limited Liability
Partnerships and Other Entities Authorized in Colorado, 24 COLO. LAW. 1525 (1995).
In addition to these entities, business trusts and cooperatives have enjoyed a
resurgence of interest.
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liability companies,' limited liability partnerships,9 limited
liability limited partnerships," and limited partnership associa-
tions.11 These entities were initially created to allow their owners
to combine the limited liability features of a corporation with the
favorable pass-through tax treatment of a partnership. But they
are also attractive to business organizers who do not necessarily
seek the advantages of pass-through taxation because these
entities provide more organizational flexibility than does the
traditional corporation. This greater flexibility is a reflection of
the same pressures that have moved corporate law away from
mandatory provisions.
The third challenge comes from the Internal Revenue Service
("Service"), which has promulgated the so-called check-the-box
regulations. Effective January 1, 1997, these regulations permit
unincorporated associations, such as those noted above, to choose
to be taxed as partnerships without regard to the four-factor test
that the Service traditionally has employed. 2 Prior to these new
regulations, an unincorporated association was taxed as a
corporation if it had a preponderance of the four "corporate
characteristics": (1) continuity of life, (2) centralization of
management, (3) liability for entity debts limited to the entity's
assets, and (4) free transferability of ownership interests. 3 Some
state statutes establishing new business entities were drafted in
a way to ensure that entities organized under them would fail the
test and thus be treated as partnerships for federal income tax
purposes. In light of the Service's check-the-box regulations, the
states will likely remove these limitations from their codes,
thereby increasing the attractiveness of these entities to business
organizers and further eroding the dominance of the corporate
form.
As these three challenges show, the ready alternative of
flexible unincorporated associations will only speed the evolution
8. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 7-80-101 to -1101 (Supp. 1996).
9. A limited liability partnership is a general partnership in which the partners
are riot liable for the debts and obligations of the partnership and that has registered
pursuant to COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-60-144 (Supp. 1996).
10. A limited liability limited partnership is a limited partnership in which the
general partners are not liable for the debts and obligations of the partnership and
that has registered pursuant to COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-60-144 (Supp. 1996).
11. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 7-63-101 to -117 (Supp. 1996).
12. See Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-2 to -3 (1997).
13. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2 (as amended in 1993).
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of the corporation statute away from mandatory provisions, and
the statutes governing these various forms of business entities
will become indiscernible from one another. Indeed, some have
argued that the natural evolution of current trends will and
should result in a single business entity statute that would afford
the greatest amount of flexibility to the organizer of a new
business.14 In this essay, I offer an alternative course of action for
the legislature. The evolution I have described should result in
two distinct business entities: one would be the corpora-
tion-with traditional mandatory provisions-and the other
would be a flexible, limited liability entity-without mandatory
provisions.
This proposal acknowledges that both the traditional
corporation and a flexible business entity have their advantages.
The traditional corporation provides the investing community
with a familiar business entity and with investor protections
ranging from the imposition of well-established fiduciary duties
on managers to the assurance that fundamental changes in the
investment cannot occur without the invetors' consent. A purely
enabling statute, on the other hand, promotes the value of
contractual freedom and provides the state's entrepreneurs an
alternative to organizing the business under the laws of another,
more liberal, jurisdiction. Investors in the traditional corporation
can rely on the protection of mandatory provisions, while
investors in an entity created under a purely enabling statute
would be on notice to examine the terms of the governing
document.15
This proposal is also based on a vision of a post-modern world
in which the move to a single, purely enabling statute would soon
be followed by a move back to mandatory provisions. The
mandatory provisions that are currently a part of the typical
corporate code can be traced back to abuses that occurred in their
14. Evidence of this trend can be found in a bill, which would provide for a
uniform standard of fiduciary duties for all business entities, recently introduced in
the Pennsylvania legislature. See S. 1506, 180th Leg., Spec. Sess. (Pa. 1996).
15. To be sure, these statutes would have to include default provisions when the
governing documents are silent on an issue. But whether these default provisions
should mirror the mandatory and default provisions of the corporate code or,
alternatively, whether they should be based on some other criterion-such as
provisions that would likely be agreed to by the parties dealing at arm's length-is
a question beyond the scope of this article.
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absence. 6 If a state provided only an enabling statute, and
abuses were to occur-which they surely would-the legislature
would likely respond to public pressure and restore mandatory
provisions. The result in this post-modern world would be that
the law would afford neither a purely enabling statute nor a
comprehensive mandatory statute. No one would be happy, and
the experience of recent years, in which the corporate code has
undergone numerous revisions, or tinkering, would be repeated.17
In the next two sections of this essay, I will discuss the
justifications for mandatory terms and, looking to Colorado law,
an example of how a state legislature has responded to the trends
I have noted above. The essay concludes with a discussion of the
proposal that the traditional corporation be retained.
I. MANDATORY PROVISIONS AND THE GOAL OF EFFICIENCY
All corporate statutes have limited liability for investors in
the enterprise," The reason for this feature is an assumption
that an environment in which investors bear no liability beyond
the amount invested if the enterprise fails will enhance capital
formation and, hence, economic activity. Beyond this, corporate
statutes tend to be enabling statutes that give the organizers of
the entity considerable discretion in shaping the terms of
corporate governance. 9 Presumably, organizers will choose the
most economically efficient form of governance.
Given the pervasiveness of limited liability and the apparent
justification for it, as well as the freedom provided by the modern
enabling statute, one might conclude that the driving force behind
16. For instance, in 1994, when the Colorado General Assembly adopted the
Colorado Business Corporation Act, it added a provision, not found in the Colorado
Corporate Code or in the Revised Model Business Corporation Act, to protect
shareholders from being squeezed out without compensation in a reverse stock split.
See COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-113-102(2.5) (Supp. 1996). The legislature was reacting to
a transaction in which such an abuse occurred.
17. In recent years, significant amendments to the Colorado corporate law
occurred in 1987, 1990, 1994, and 1996. In 1994 the Colorado legislature adopted the
Colorado Business Corporation Act, which was a substantial amendment to the
earlier Colorado Corporation Code.
18. Limited liability is also a feature of the alternative organizational forms
previously discussed. See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text. For a brief
philosophy of limited liability, see Theresa Gabaldon, Experiencing Limited Liability:
On Insularity and Inbreeding in Corporate Law, in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW
111, 11.2-14 (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995).
19. See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text.
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the corporate Statute is the desire to encourage capital formation
and economic efficiency. But a close examination of a typical
state corporate code reveals that these goals are often tempered
by provisions that further other, possibly conflicting, policies. For
instance, many states have provisions in their corporate codes
that permit2 ° or, in at least one instance, require2' directors to
consider the interests of constituencies other than shareholders
in making business decisions.22 Because shareholders are the
residual claimants in the corporate framework, and their
interests are served only by maximizing profits, these statutes, in
effect, permit the board to pursue a course of action that is not
profit maximizing, or not economically efficient. It is thus
impossible to reconcile the existence of such provisions with the
idea that corporate codes solely seek to serve one purpose;
shareholder wealth maximization is tempered by other policy
goals.
Because the typical corporate statute reflects inconsistent
policies, no policy is well-served. For example, if the corporate
statute in jurisdiction A protects other constituencies while the
limited liability company act in jurisdiction A does not, or while
the corporate statute of jurisdiction B does not, the organizers of
the business enterprise may well opt for one of the latter two
alternatives, thereby defeating the ability of the legislature of
jurisdiction A to realize its goal of other constituency protection.
In addition to the inclusion of some provisions that appear on
their face to serve conflicting policy goals, many provisions of the
typical state corporation law might be classified as of doubtful
efficiency. In other words, fully informed investors and corporate
promoters might not include the provision in their contract if they
had full freedom of contract. For instance, many corporate
statutes provide that shareholders may act without a meeting
only when there is unanimous written consent of the sharehold-
20. Since the 1980s, 29 states have adopted such statutes: Arizona,
Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, New
Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See Eric W. Orts, Beyond
Shareholders: Interpreting Corporate Constituency Statutes, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
14, 27 n.56 (1992).
21. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-313(e) (West Supp. 1996).
22. See supra note 3.
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ers. 2  The rationale for requiring unanimous, as opposed to
majority, consent is an apparent distrust of actions taken by
shareholders without a meeting; legislators fear that the minority
shareholders might somehow be taken advantage of if they
cannot voice their concerns at a meeting of shareholders.
It is possible, however, that if investors and organizers
contracted with regard to such a provision, they would conclude
that it is more efficient to permit shareholders owning a majority
of outstanding shares to act without a meeting by written
consent.2 4 Again, those deciding which state to choose for the
jurisdiction of incorporation might prefer the state that allows
informal shareholder action by less than unanimous written
consent, all other things being equal. Of course, it is possible that
the contracting parties would voluntarily choose a provision that
matched the state-mandated one. But the possibility that they
would not choose a matching provision raises the question of why
the state mandated the provision in the first instance. If the
parties affected by the provision do not want it, why does the
state insist upon it? And if the parties, freely contracting, would
prefer the state-mandated provision, then why should the state
bother to mandate it?
It is against this background that the debate over mandatory
versus enabling statutes has taken place. The search for a
coherent and persuasive philosophy to justify mandatory terms
is not a search through wholly uncharted waters. Indeed,
corporate law scholars have actively debated this question for
more than a decade and, like most academic debates, no consen-
sus has emerged. At the one extreme, alluded to above, is the
contractarian philosophy that no mandatory terms are justifiable;
it trumpets the value of giving the participants in the corporate
enterprise-managers, shareholders, creditors, employees-the
maximum freedom to fashion their relations in the way they
choose. In brief, this philosophy holds that the state is ill-
situated to mandate the terms of corporate governance, especially
in comparison with the parties who risk their capital or liveli-
23. It is not sufficient under these statutes for shareholders holding a majority
of the stock to approve the action by written consent, even though they would have
sufficient votes to approve the action at a shareholders' meeting. See, e.g., REVISED
MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 7.04 (1985); COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-107-104 (Supp. 1996).
24. The Delaware corporate law so provides. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 216,
228 (1991).
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hoods on the terms. An essential assumption of this philosophy,
as it concerns corporate governance, is that the market for
corporate stock will price the terms of governance." If sharehold-
ers are disadvantaged by these terms, the price of the stock will
be correspondingly lowered to the disadvantage of the promoters
of the enterprise. The promoters thus will bear the financial
burden of unfair terms.26
When one sails away from a purely contractarian view of the
corporation, as most scholars do, the waters become murky.
While these scholars agree that the state should mandate certain
terms, they vary widely on what should be mandated and often
either demonstrate a great reluctance to articulate a standard, or
articulate a standard too vague to be of much usefulness to a
lawmaker. For instance, in 1989, the Columbia Law Review held
a symposium, entitled "Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law,"27
to answer, in the words of the foreword to the symposium, these
questions: "To what extent should corporations be allowed to opt
out of the rules of corporate law by adopting charter provisions to
that effect? That is, should any corporate law rules be manda-
tory, and, if so, which rules?"28
The first contribution to this symposium is an article by
Judge Easterbrook and Professor Fischel, stating the contract-
arian argument in its strongest terms.29 They thus answer the
first question by saying that corporations should be free to fully
opt out, and thereby moot the second question. The remaining
articles all seem to start from the presumption that some
mandatory terms are appropriate, but only one author, Professor
Eisenberg, attempts to offer a coherent standard for what terms
25. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 2, at 17.
26. See id. ("To obtain an (inefficient) right to divert opportunities (the
manager] must pay in advance."); see also Eugene Fama, Random Walks in Stock
Market Prices, FIN. ANALYSTS J., Sept.-Oct. 1965, at 55 (supporting a strong version
of the efficient market hypothesis). Professor Fama seems to have backed away from
the idea that the market efficiently prices "suboptimal governance" provisions. See
Eugene Fama, Efficient Capital Markets II, 46 J. FIN. 1575 (1991) (expressing some
skepticism). See generally Uriel Procaccia, Crafting a Corporate Code from Scratch,
17 CARDozO L. REV. 629, 639-40 n.38 (1996).
27. See Symposium, supra note 2, at 1395.
28. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Debate on Contractual Freedom in Corporate
Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1395 (1989).
29. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89
COLUM. L. REV. 1416 (1989).
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ought to be mandatory.3" The other contributors either seek to
rationalize the appropriateness of mandatory terms,31 or describe
the role of the judiciary in an environment in which mandatory
terms are of marginal importance.32 Unfortunately, Professor
Eisenberg's valiant effort is both flawed and too vague to be of
much use to a lawmaker.
While generally accepting the contractarian philosophy,
Professor Eisenberg insists on two important qualifications.
First, in closely held corporations, the law must operate as it does
in the typical contract, providing relief where a party has been
unfairly taken advantage of or where one party has engaged in
opportunistic behavior that was not reasonably anticipated.33
Second, in publicly held corporations, the market cannot be
trusted to fairly price negotiated terms of corporate governance.
Thus, mandatory terms are necessary to protect against the
overreaching that would otherwise take place.34
These ideas are interesting, though ultimately impractical.
Professor Eisenberg's highly abstract formulation does not
provide sufficient guidance to even the most conscientious
legislator. For instance, Eisenberg states that shareholders of
closely held corporations should not be able to "relax materially
the fiduciary rules set by law," because shareholders are unable
to anticipate the consequences of such actions.3" He thus implies,
I believe, that the shareholders should not be able to waive the
liability of directors for violations of the fiduciary duty of care, yet
he notes that a number of states permit the shareholders to do
just that.3' He makes no attempt to square these statutes with
his general principle, and expresses no opinion as to whether
these statutes represent sound public policy. In short, on this
critical question of mandatory versus optional provisions,
Eisenberg demurs.
30. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law, 89 COLUM.
L. REV. 1461 (1989).
31. See, e.g., Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, 89
COLUM. L. REV. 1549 (1989).
32. See Robert C. Clark, Contracts, Elites, and Traditions in the Making of
Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1703 (1989); John C. Coffee, Jr., The
Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate Law: An Essay on the Judicial Role, 89
COLUM. L. REV. 1618 (1989).
33. See Eisenberg, supra note 30, at 1463-70.
34. See id. at 1471-1515.
35. Id. at 1469.
36. See id. at 1477.
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With respect to publicly held corporations, Eisenberg focuses
on the need for mandatory rules to limit the "positional conflicts"
of top management.37 By positional conflicts, he means, among
other things, actions top managers may take to enhance their
personal power, prestige, and wealth at the expense of sharehold-
ers without engaging in actions that would normally be consid-
ered a conflict of interest. 38
Professor Eisenberg identifies two types of rules that should
be mandatory: fiduciary rules and "core structural rules."39
Professor Eisenberg pays particular attention to core structural
rules because these rules address positional conflicts. Thus, he
writes:
[C]ore structural rules should require mechanisms for ac-
countability and disclosure for top executives, shareholder
approval of certain transactions, and appraisal rights for
certain transactions, but they should not regulate the content
of corporate transactions. Because mandatory rules generally
should not regulate the content of transactions, distributional
rules should generally be enabling, except as required to
protect the interests of creditors.
4 °
After announcing this general principle, Eisenberg reviews
the typical menu of mandatory rules under state law, and
"mandatory rules" under federal securities laws for companies
registered under section 12(g) of the Securities and Exchange Act
of 1934 and, where applicable, under the New York Stock
Exchange Rules. On the basis of this review, he reassuringly
concludes that "to a significant extent, these are just the manda-
tory rules that corporation law should contain. 41
On close examination, this conclusion is anything but
reassuring. In the course of reviewing mandatory state law
37. Id. at 1480.
38. See id. at 1472. Professor Eisenberg gives these examples:
They may seek to increase corporate size as a way to maximize their
power, prestige, and salary, even if an increase in corporate size does not
increase shareholder wealth. They may seek to maximize the cash and
other resources that they command, even when distributions to the
shareholders would be more efficient. They may diversify the firm as a
means to reduce the riskiness of their human-capital investments, even
when diversification of the firm is not in the interest of shareholders.
Id.
39. Id. at 1480.
40. Id. at 1481.
41. Id. at 1485.
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provisions, Eisenberg notes the varying approaches of the states,
Delaware being the least regulatory and California among the
most regulatory, with a marked difference between those states.
Given that range, and Eisenberg's vague endorsement of the
current state of the law, it becomes clear that his general
pronouncements on what should be mandatory are largely useless
to the conscientious legislator. A lawmaker would have little help
in deciding, for instance, whether the corporate code should
provide an appraisal remedy in the event of a charter amend-
ment. Delaware does not provide one, the Revised Model
Business Corporation Act does provide one, and Professor
Eisenberg cites both with approval.
Unlike most who question the contractarian approach,
Professor Eisenberg at least attempts to articulate some guiding
principles. Others who share his skepticism of the contractarian
philosophy can be classified into two schools of thought. The first
school argues that mandatory terms in corporate codes do not
detract from the corporation's ability to maximize profits and
may, in fact, enhance that ability.4 Adherents to the second
school maintain that maximization of corporate profits, to the
exclusion of the other, possibly competing goals, is not the
appropriate policy for the law to achieve, and that the nature of
the modern corporation is such that parties other than sharehold-
ers have a stake in corporate decisions. The interests of these
other stakeholders, they argue, are entitled to consideration."
Neither school has been successful in articulating a practical
test for determining where to draw the line between enabling and
mandatory rules. A representative of the first school, Professor
Gordon, rationalizes the existence of mandatory rules as arising
from a defect in the bargaining process that characterizes the
contractarian philosophy. 45 He suggests that the most likely
42. See id. at 1482-83.
43. See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 31, at 1549. Professor Gordon takes the view
that if private wealth maximization is the goal of corporate law, that goal is best
reached with a mix of optional and mandatory legal rules. But cf. Victor Brudney,
Corporate Governance, Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric of Contract, 85 COLUM. L. REV.
1403 (1985) (arguing that the contractarian approach is unlikely to maximize
shareholder wealth and is more likely to enhance management's ability to engage in
opportunistic behavior); Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of
Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DUKE L.J. 879 (1988) (expressing doubts about the
wisdom of allowing firms to contract out of fiduciary duties).
44. See, e.g., Millon, supra note 3.
45. See Gordon, supra note 31.
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explanation for mandatory terms is what he calls the "opportu-
nistic amendment hypothesis"-that mandatory rules protect
shareholders against management-proposed charter amendments
that advantage managers at the expense of shareholders.46 The
mandatory nature of these rules is a state-provided guarantee
that has the effect of making the securities more marketable,
thus accomplishing a goal of the contractarians in a more efficient
manner.
Professor Gordon's explanation is unpersuasive. While it
may be true that mandatory rules protect against some forms of
opportunism, they hardly protect against all forms. For instance,
mandatory rules generally do not restrict managerial opportun-
ism in the realm of antitakeover devices that do not require
shareholder approval, such as poison pills. 47 More importantly,
drawing the lessons from the hypotheses, Gordon provides this
guidance to legislators: in deciding whether to make a specific
term optional, "the legislature should assume that the insiders
will use the opt-out right in the manner most favorable to them
and ask whether, nevertheless, public shareholders are better off
on average. 48
This guide is hardly a beacon of light to the legislator-it is
not always apparent what is most favorable to the insider. The
matter of informal shareholder action is a good illustration.
Would insiders prefer that shareholders be able to act informally
with only majority consent? Insiders would prefer majority
consent if they knew, ex ante, that they would be seeking
shareholder approval, but not if an insurgent group of sharehold-
ers would be seeking shareholder approval to oust them from
office. Because of that uncertainty, corporate managers probably
would prefer a regime in which they were immune from surrepti-
tious shareholder action, and thus would opt for a unanimous
consent rule. But the Colorado legislature viewed the situation
quite differently, sensing that informal shareholder action by
majority consent posed a threat by insiders, not against them.49
46. See id. at 1573.
47. See Roberta Romano, Answering the Wrong Question: The Tenuous Case for
Mandatory Corporate Laws, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1599 (1989) (criticizing Gordon's
article).
48. Gordon, supra note 31, at 1598.
49. This insight is based on the author's conversations with a key Colorado
legislator, then Senate majority leader Tim Foster.
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Moreover, the law of most states, Colorado among them, does
not differentiate between closely held corporations and publicly
held corporations." It seems fair to assume that the shareholders
and managers of most closely held corporations would prefer to
allow shareholders to act informally by majority consent. The
convenience factor is considerable. But what about publicly held
corporations? If my assumption about managerial preferences is
correct, then the opposite is true. To accommodate Gordon's
philosophy, then, the legislature would have to provide different
mandatory rules, depending on the nature of the corporation-not
a happy turn of events.
My point is not to criticize the thoughtful work of Professors
Gordon and Eisenberg, but rather to illustrate the difficulty-or
impossibility-of trying to articulate a coherent rationale for
mandatory rules. Similar criticism can be leveled against those
who believe corporate law should further values other than profit
maximization. Scholars writing from this perspective generally
advocate that law ought to further values such as trust and
communitarianism.51 How this translates into the terms of a
corporate code is utterly unclear.
Despite these analytical difficulties, mandatory rules surely
have a place in corporate law, from a theoretical perspective as
well as from a practical perspective. As a theoretical matter, the
contractarian view rests heavily on the questionable assumption
that the market will accurately price the terms of corporate
governance.52 The "market" for stock of closely held corporations
is nonexistent and it is therefore inappropriate to consider it an
accurate pricing tool for such stock. Indeed, the investors in the
stock of closely held corporations need the fiduciary protections
of mandatory provisions because of the degree of trust that they
place in promoters; they generally cannot anticipate the many
ways in which that trust can be tested.53
50. Some states have special provisions that may be elected by close
corporations. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 341-356 (1991 & Supp. 1994 &
Pamph. 3 1996). See generally F. HODGE O'NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O'NEAL's
CLOSE CORPORATIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE § 1.18 (1986).
51. See Millon, supra note 3.
52. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 2, at 17-22.
53. See Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political and Economic
Analysis, 84 NW. U. L. REv. 542, 572 (1990) ("Close corporation investors also will
often lack the base of experience to envision the many ways that conflict may arise
over a long time period, and thus may misvalue fiduciary protections."); Eisenberg,
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Even for the stock of a company going public, one must
question whether the market will accurately price the governance
terms. As a preliminary matter, many such offerings are small,
not attracting the sophisticated investors who might influence the
pricing on the basis of governance terms.5 4 More fundamentally,
serious questions have been raised as to whether the stock
market is as efficient as once supposed in pricing information,
especially information of this sort.55 An institutional investor
whose investment horizon is short may undervalue a charter
provision that seems to have remote, long-term effects. Finally,
even if the offering is large, and sophisticated investors are
buying, it requires a leap of faith to assume that these investors
will spend the time necessary to study and evaluate what may
seem like arcane points of corporate governance. Some may, but
some may not, with the result that the market may not operate
efficiently even in this best case scenario.
As a practical matter, mandatory terms respond to perceived
unfairness in an unregulated market. They represent a rational
legislative response to political pressures. Trying to craft a
corporate code without mandatory provisions would be like trying
to design a tea kettle without a vent for steam: it may look neat,
but it won't work.
The Colorado approach to mandatory terms is typical. The
corporate code contains a number of mandatory provisions, but
recent amendments to the code demonstrate the legislature's
ambivalence about them. The next section demonstrates that
Colorado, like many other jurisdictions, has produced a hybrid
corporate code that pleases neither those who advocate share-
holder protection nor those who prefer complete freedom of
contract.
supra note 30, at 1464-66 (arguing that close corporation investors underestimate
such risks).
54. See Black, supra note 53, at 571 n.83 (citing a study by Ibbotson, Sindelar
& Ritter, Initial Public Offerings, 1 CONTINENTAL BANK J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 37
(1988) (indicating that a majority of the firms with an initial public offering during
the period 1975 to 1984 had annual sales under $5,000,000)).
55. Evidence of the efficiency of the market in this regard is lacking. See
Eisenberg, supra note 30, at 1502 nn.192-96 and sources therein; see also supra note
26.
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II. THE COLORADO LEGISLATIVE APPROACH
The Colorado legislature has faced the issue of adding or
deleting mandatory terms several times in recent years; three
examples highlight the dilemma. First, the Colorado Business
Corporation Act, which was enacted in 1994, included a provision,
based on the Revised Model Business Corporation Act, that would
have allowed a shareholder to dissent from certain amendments
to the corporation's articles of incorporation and receive the
appraised value of the shareholder's stock.56 In 1996, the
Colorado legislature repealed this provision based on testimony
from members of the bar that the provision inhibited the ability
of Colorado corporations to raise capital because venture capital-
ists objected to it.57  The objection of the venture capitalists
apparently stemmed from their perception that they may need
charter amendments to enhance future financing opportunities,
and the possibility of dissenters' rights would add to the cost of
such financings. 8 This inadequacy in Colorado law in turn might
prompt Colorado corporations to reincorporate in Delaware,
which has no comparable provision. Thus, a mandatory provision
originally intended to protect the interests of minority sharehold-
ers who could not or did not bargain for veto rights over charter
56. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-113-102(2) (1994) (repealed 1996). The appraisal
rights provision stated:
A shareholder, whether or not entitled to vote, is entitled to dissent and
obtain payment of the fair value of the shareholder's shares in the event
of:
(a) An amendment to the articles of incorporation that materially and
adversely affects rights in respect of the shares because it:
(I) Alters or abolishes a preferential right of the shares;
(II) Creates, alters, or abolishes a right in respect of redemption of the
shares, including a provision respecting a sinking fund for their
redemption or repurchase; or
(b) An amendment to the articles of incorporation that affects rights in
respect of the shares because it:
(I) Excludes or limits the right of the shares to vote on any matter, or to
cumulate votes, other than a limitation by dilution through issuance of
shares or other securities with similar voting rights; or
(II) Reduces the number of shares owned by a shareholder to a fraction
of a share or to scrip if the fractional share or scrip so created is to be
acquired for cash or the scrip is to be voided under section 7-106-104.
Id. The Colorado Business Corporation Act replaced the Colorado Corporate Code.
57. In discussing this legislative history, the author relies on conversations with
members of the Colorado Bar Association who were present at the legislative
hearings.
58. And, presumably, the corporation would be unable to undertake any charter
amendments without the consent of the venture capitalist.
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amendments, as venture capitalists typically do, was abandoned
in favor of a policy that furthered the interests of highly sophisti-
cated institutional investors.59
In a second significant 1996 amendment to the Colorado
Business Corporation Act, the legislature also eliminated the
right to dissent and seek appraisal in the event of a merger, share
exchange, or disposition of substantially all of the corporation's
assets, if the corporation's shares are publicly traded. 0 The
rationale for this change, which alters a long-standing provision
of Colorado law, is that shareholders dissatisfied with the
transaction can sell their shares in the public market and thus do
not need the protections of the dissenters' rights provisions. And,
like the amendment that eliminated the right to dissent from
charter amendments, this amendment favors venture capitalists
who wish to minimize the costs of transactions of which they
approve and, incidentally, conforms Colorado law to Delaware's.
Again the interests of the less-sophisticated shareholder have
been adversely affected because some mergers, share exchanges,
or assets sales may be viewed dimly by the market, causing the
price of the corporation's publicly traded stock to decline after the
announcement of the transaction. The dissenting shareholder is
stuck with this lower, post-announcement price, while under the
earlier version of the statute, that shareholder would have been
entitled to receive the fair value of his stock "excluding any
59. The official comment to the Revised Model Business Corporation Act
explained the rationale for granting dissenters' rights under these circumstances:
The reasons for granting a right to dissent in these situations are similar
to those granting such rights in cases of merger and transfer of assets.
The grant of these rights increases the security of investors by allowing
them to escape when the nature of their investment rights is
fundamentally altered or they are compelled to accept cash for their
investment in an amount established by the corporation. The grant also
enhances the freedom of the majority to make changes, because the
existence of an escape hatch makes fair and reasonable a change that
might be unfair if it forced a fundamental change of rights upon unwilling
investors without giving them an alternative.
REVISED MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT, § 13.02 cmt. 1(4) (1985).
From a philosophical perspective, affording dissenters' rights in these
circumstances is appealing. It acts as a check against management opportunism and
presents one of the strongest cases for mandatory terms. See Gordon, supra note 31,
at 1586.
60. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-113-102(1.3) (1994 & Supp. 1996). The
amendment, like the first example, reflects the legislature's propensity to conform
Colorado law to Delaware's, which has contained a similar provision since 1967. See
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(b) (1991 & Supp. 1994 & Pamph. 1 1996).
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appreciation or depreciation in anticipation of the corporate
action."'"
The third example, involving a core fiduciary duty of direc-
tors, is perhaps the most troubling. Responding to the 1985
decision of the Delaware Supreme Court in Smith v. Van
Gorkom,"2 which imposed liability on corporate directors for
breaching their fiduciary duty of due care, the Delaware legisla-
ture amended its corporate code to provide relief from the
decision. As amended, the Delaware code allows a Delaware
corporation to remove the liability of directors for breaches of the
duty of care by so providing in its articles of incorporation.63
Many other states," including Colorado, quickly followed suit. 5
The shift in the potential liability of directors was as striking as
it was sudden.
The 1996 amendments to the Colorado Business Corporation
Act and the earlier legislative determination to allow Colorado
corporations to limit the liability of directors for breaches of the
duty of due care have thus removed three "mandatory" provisions
from the law, provisions that by their terms applied to all
Colorado corporations and could not be altered by charter
provision or otherwise. The principal motivating force behind all
three amendments-that Colorado law ought not impose eco-
nomic costs on Colorado domestic corporations if the Delaware
code does not-may be a standard of sorts, but is not a very
convincing one.
Meeting the competitive challenge means that the Colorado
legislature will always be in a reactive mode, and the corporate
61. COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-113-101(4) (1994 & Supp. 1996).
62. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
63. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (Supp. 1994). The certificate of
incorporation may contain
a provision eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a director to
the corporation or its stockholders for monetary damages for breach of
(the duty of due care], provided that such provision shall not eliminate or
limit the liability of a director ... for acts or omissions not in good faith
or which involve intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of law.
Id.
64. By the middle of 1988, less than two years after the Delaware legislature
adopted its opt out provision, at least 30 states had enacted laws similar to
Delaware's. See James J. Hanks, Jr., Evaluating Recent State Legislation on Director
and Officer Liability Limitation and Indemnification, 43 Bus. LAW. 1207, 1210
(1988).
65. Colorado amended its law in 1987 to add the opt out provision. See COLO.
REV. STAT. § 7-108-402 (Supp. 1996).
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statute will be revised frequently, thereby adding uncertainty to
the law.66 Moreover, the legislature will be unable to enact any
new mandatory provisions because of the fear that the statute
would be at an immediate competitive disadvantage. Finally, it
means, at bottom, a loss of sovereignty when the laws of a state
are essentially dictated by the laws of another state. Indeed, it is
incumbent upon a legislature to articulate convincing policy
reasons for its legislative actions. If there was a persuasive
reason for granting shareholders dissenters' rights in the event
of certain amendments to the articles of incorporation, these
reasons ought to remain persuasive even if the Delaware
legislature decides the issue differently.
It is fair to conclude that Colorado corporate law, like the law
of other states, lacks a coherent philosophy. It is like a ship
adrift, subject to the tides and winds of the moment. In 1994, the
Colorado legislature provided a new protection to minority
shareholders. Two years later, it amended this protection out of
existence. Yet the threat of abuses that prompted the protection
in 1994 is still present. There is a need for a stable and predict-
able corporate law that provides protections to minority share-
holders. At the same time, the demands that state law provide
greater freedom of contract will persist. The next section sets
forth a proposal to address both of these demands.
III. A RECOMMENDATION AND CONCLUSION
From a practical perspective, the debate surrounding
mandatory rules tends to minimize the historical significance of
the corporate form and the value attached by individual investors
to that form. Investors in the corporate form likely know that
they are not liable for the debts of the corporation, that they have
the right to elect directors, that directors are their fiduciaries,
and that they have the right to vote as a condition to the imple-
mentation of certain fundamental changes to their investment.
In short, much of what is mandatory in corporate law has been
internalized in the investment decision of shareholders. The
large body of law, case law as well as statutory, and the accumu-
lated judicial experience in resolving disputes on the basis of this
law, are of value and worth preserving. Replacing this law with
66. See supra note 17.
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private contract creates transaction costs that must be weighed
against the purported benefits.
Nevertheless, it is unrealistic to assume that a state legisla-
ture would ignore the pleas that the state corporate statute "keep
pace" with the law elsewhere. Thus, I make these two recommen-
dations:
1. If the state continues the corporate form, it should do so
in its traditional form, with the traditional duties of care and
loyalty and the shareholder protections, such as dissenters'
rights, that have long been a part of the corporate form. Because
there are alternatives to incorporation, the legislature should
reconsider shareholder protections that have been sacrificed over
the years to meet the challenges of more flexible statutes enacted
elsewhere.
2. The contractarian viewpoint ought to find its expression
in alternatives to incorporation, which ought to provide maximum
freedom of contract. Thus, one investing in a corporation would
be able to rely on certain traditional protections, while one
investing in, say, a limited liability company would know that
this was a custom-made entity, which may not even impose duties
of care and loyalty on the managers.
This formulation would allow the continuation of the
corporate form as it has been known. It would reduce transaction
costs because investors will not have to obtain, read, and analyze
documents such as a corporation's charter and bylaws before
deciding to invest. This would also mean the end to the legisla-
ture's tinkering with corporate statutes, tinkering that is
transforming the meaning of the term "corporation" from an
entity with certain characteristics to an entity with evolving and
changing characteristics. 7 Under this approach, corporations
would remain entities with certain immutable mandatory terms;
all other business entities would be contractarian in nature. I
would also suggest that only entities formed under the corporate
code could use the name "corporation," or its abbreviation, thus
indicating to investors that the protections of the corporate code
are available. 8
67. See supra note 17.
68. Both corporations and limited liability companies could use the words
"company" or "limited" in their abbreviations in their names.
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In light of the check-the-box regulations adopted by the
Service, 9 state legislatures should reexamine the statutes
authorizing the formation of noncorporate entities with a view to
consolidating these statutes. Since the pass-through tax status
would be assured, provisions such as those that limit the duration
of the entity can be safely removed.70 Organizers who prefer a
limited duration can easily provide for it in the organizing
documents. When these and other mandatory provisions are
removed, the differences among the various noncorporate
business entity statutes will not be significant. For instance, a
consolidated statute might simply provide that ownership
interests in the entity are freely transferable except as otherwise
provided in the governing agreement or document. If the
organizers of the entity prefer to limit the voting rights of
secondary purchasers, as many limited partnership agreements
presently do, this can be provided easily enough.
More controversially, a consolidated statute might provide
that the managers of the entity owe fiduciary duties of due care
and loyalty to the owners, unless the governing agreement
provides otherwise.7 It is tempting to preserve the duty of
loyalty as an immutable characteristic in any situation in which
a principal employs an agent, but such temptations should be
resisted. The corporate form will retain the duty of loyalty, and
if parties desire to dispense with it, they should have the freedom
to do so under a consolidated statute. 2 Indeed, the Restatement
(Second) of Agency has long recognized the freedom of a principal
69. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
70. The Colorado limited liability company statute provides that unless the
operating agreement otherwise provides, the LLC dissolves upon the death,
retirement, resignation, expulsion, bankruptcy, or dissolution of a member of the
LLC, unless the remaining members unanimously consent to continue the business
of the LLC. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-801(1)(c) (Supp. 1996). In the absence of tax
considerations, a more sensible provision would likely mirror the corporate model:
the duration of the LLC is perpetual, unless the operating agreement otherwise
provides.
71. Under the Uniform Limited Liability Company Act ("ULLCA"), the
operating agreement cannot eliminate the duty of loyalty, but may "identify specific
types or categories of activities that do not violate the duty of loyalty, if not
manifestly unreasonable." ULLCA § 103(b)(2)(1) (1995). Similarly the operating
agreement may modify the duty of due care, but cannot "unreasonably reduce" it.
ULLCA § 103(b)(3) (1995).
72. The Delaware limited liability company act, for instance, does not provide
any standards of conduct for managers or members. The parties are free to set forth
applicable terms. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 18-303, -405 (1993 & Supp. 1994).
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and agent contracting with one another to dispense with fiduciary
duties.7" Thus, a consolidated statute would be a simple enabling
statute with default provisions that might mirror the analogous
corporate provisions, or reflect some other value, such as the
provisions to which fully informed parties bargaining at arm's
length would agree.
The change would also simplify the lives of the business bar,
and benefit clients. Now faced with an array of choices, the
typical lawyer is at pains to decide whether a limited liability
company, limited liability partnership, limited liability limited
partnership, old-fashioned corporation, or some other business
entity would best serve the client's needs. Subtle differences
among the various statutes authorizing these entities, such as
what documents need to be filed with the state and when, add
unnecessarily to the complexity of a business law practice.
Clients would benefit in at least two ways. First, the choice
of entity would be more clear to the client, who could then make
a more informed decision than is likely under current law.
Second, with cleaner, simpler statutes, the cost of legal services
should decline, and the quality should improve.
What is proposed here, in short, is a brave new world of
business entities, which includes an experiment in the efficacy of
the contractarian model, with the continuing safety net of the
traditional corporate model. The two competing forms would soon
gain a reputation in the investment community. The competitive
advantages of the contractarian model may or may not be realized
when put to the market test. Investors may shy away from
limited liability companies if stories of abuse materialize. On the
other hand, if such entities prove to be superior vehicles for
making profits, as contractarians insist, then the entities will
prevail in the marketplace. It will not take long for the results of
this competition to become known.
73. For instance, the phrase "unless otherwise agreed" qualifies the agent's
duty to account for profits. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 388 (1958).
Other fiduciary duties are similarly qualified. See generally J. Dennis Hynes,
Fiduciary Duty and RUPA An Inquiry into Freedom of Contract, 58 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 29, 44 (1995).

